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Antitrust’s “Jurisdictional” Reach Abroad 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Until recently decisions interpreting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act 
(FTAIA)1 have held or assumed that the provision states a limitation on the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts rather than a limitation on the merits of the 
antitrust claim.2  In many decisions the issue has limited practical importance, because 
the complaint would have been dismissed on either interpretation of the statute.  For 
example, in its Empagran decision the Supreme Court appeared to assume that the 
FTAIA is jurisdictional.3  Nevertheless, the decision appears to have been based 
exclusively on the allegations contained in the complaint, rather than independent fact 
findings by the judge.4  If the complaint itself is insufficient to state a claim then the 
action fails on either interpretation of the statute. 
Whatever the practical differences between the two interpretations, the theoretical 
differences are very real.  In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
the judge’s purview of the facts is limited to what is alleged in the complaint plus some 
other facts subject to the court’s judicial notice, and the judge must accept the alleged 
facts as true.  By contrast, if the FTAIA is jurisdictional then the complaint must not 
merely state a claim under these 12(b)(6) standards, but the judge may also go “off 
complaint” to consider whether alleged facts are true or examine other facts pertaining 
to jurisdiction.  A purely “facial” challenge would look at the jurisdictional facts alleged in 
a complaint, much as would be done in a 12(b)(6) challenge.5  In a broader “factual” 
challenge, however, the defendant would be entitled to submit affidavits or other 
                                            
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (Oct. 8, 1982), codified at various sections of 12, 15, and 30 
U.S.C., but most relevantly at 15 U.S.C. §6a. 
2 See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶272i (3d ed. 2006). 
3 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159-160 (2004). 
4 See id. at 159. 
5 See Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(distinguishing “facial” and “factual” challenges, and noting that in considering a factual 
challenge the court “accords plaintiff's allegations no presumption of truth. In a factual attack, 
the court must weigh the evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, 
documents, and even limited evidentiary hearings.”). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962370
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evidence tending to show lack of jurisdiction.  The judge would be entitled to decide 
these facts, or else to consider additional evidence on its own motion.  As one court has 
stated it, 
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may take one of two forms 
… First, a party may make a facial challenge to the plaintiff's 
allegations concerning subject matter jurisdiction, thereby 
questioning the sufficiency of the complaint. In addressing a facial 
attack, the district court must accept the allegations in the complaint 
as true. “Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in 
the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter 
jurisdiction depends.”6 In addressing a factual attack, the court 
does not “presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual 
allegations,” but “has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other 
documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed 
jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).”7 
 
Explicitly referencing the FTAIA. another court has observed: 
it was error for the district court to accept the mere allegations of 
the complaint as a basis for finding subject matter jurisdiction. … In 
these circumstances, the court should have looked outside the 
pleadings to the submissions. The district court should consider all 
the submissions of the parties and may hold an evidentiary hearing, 
if it considers such a hearing is warranted, in resolving the question 
of jurisdiction. Before arriving at its legal conclusion regarding the 
existence vel non of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court 
should resolve the disputed factual matters by means of findings of 
                                            
6 Quoting Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). 
7United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 2001). Accord 
HUB Partners v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2001); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 
1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. A.D. Roe Co., Inc., 186 F.3d 717, 721 (6th Cir. 
1999) (in “factual” attack on subject matter jurisdiction, as opposed to a “facial” attack, district 
court obliged to make fact findings); Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1003 (2000).   See also 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure §1350 (Civ. 3d 1996 & Supp.) (Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must survive both a “facial” and a “factual” attack; this is 
in contrast to Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which need survive only the facial attack). 
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fact.8 
 
Other important differences are that if the statute at issue is jurisdictional the court 
may ascertain relevant jurisdictional facts at any time during the proceeding.9  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Arbaugh, “courts, including this Court, have an independent 
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence 
of a challenge from any party.”10  If the issues is jurisdictional it cannot be waived.11 
Pleading under Rule 12(b)(6) and presumably under 12(b)(1) in a facial challenge is 
governed by the standards articulated in the Supreme Court’s Twombly12 and Iqbal13 
decisions, which requires a fair degree of specificity.14  Indeed, the implications of 
heightened pleading standards are very likely to bring 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) pleading 
closer together in one very important sense.  Even under 12(b)(6) standards the plaintiff 
must plead jurisdictional facts with sufficient clarity and detail to show entitlement to 
relief.  Acting under Rule 12(b)(1) a judge may additionally verify these facts, but it 
seems unlikely that statutory reach over the activity will simply be presumed in the 
12(b)(6) context.  The plaintiff will have to plead specific facts showing that the United 
States antitrust laws apply to the conduct in question under the terms of the FTAIA. 
Nevertheless, the 12(b)(6) approach of regarding the inquiry into reach as part of the 
merits rather than jurisdiction generally favors plaintiffs.  Prior to trial allegations and 
evidence are typically construed against the movant, while in the 12(b)(1) proceeding 
                                            
8 Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 930-931 (2d Cir. 1998). On remand the 
court made fact findings and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A, 212 F. Supp. 2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001), aff'd, 304 
F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2002). 
9 See 5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1350, pp. 243-249 (3d ed.2004).  
10 Arbaugh v Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
11 Ibid.  See also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). 
12 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
13Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
14 On the impact of these cases in the pleading of antitrust complaints, see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA 
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶307 (3d ed. 2007); Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95 IOWA L.REV. BULL. 55 (2010). 
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the judge acts as a neutral fact finder.  Further, to the extent that the 12(b)(6) 
interpretation protracts the litigation, perhaps delaying the issue of extraterritorial reach 
until summary judgment or even the trial stage, plaintiffs will be able to obtain more 
favorable settlements. 
 Recently the Third Circuit held that the FTAIA’s limitations on the reach of the 
antitrust laws should be regarded as a part of the merits of an antitrust claim rather than 
a limitation on subject matter.15  The Third Circuit was following Supreme Court 
decisions subsequent to Empagran which declared that a federal statute will not be 
construed as jurisdictional unless the legislature “clearly states” that its limitation should 
“count as jurisdictional.”16  Interestingly, the Arbaugh decision listed earlier decisions 
that had assumed a jurisdictional interpretation too quickly, but Empagran and the 
FTAIA were not among them.17 
In its jurisprudence on exterritorial reach the Supreme Court has stated two 
principles that may sometimes pull against one another.  One is that extraterritoriality is 
not to be presumed.18  The other is that, even in cases involving the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, the issue of reach should be regarded as part of the coverage 
of the statute rather than as limiting federal subject matter jurisdiction, unless Congress 
has clearly stated the contrary.19 
The presumption against extraterritorial reach is a canon of statutory construction 
and thus presents a question of law.  It almost certainly does not apply in any blanket 
fashion to the Sherman Act, however, whose language is clearly not “boilerplate” and 
reaches restraints with a scope that tracks the language of the foreign commerce clause 
of the United States Constitution.  Further, while the FTAIA was intended to limit the 
Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach, it also expressly acknowledged that some 
extraterritorial reach exists. The statute provides that the Sherman Act “shall not apply 
                                            
15 Animal Science Prods., Inc. v China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011). 
16Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–16 (2006).  See also Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 
130 S.Ct. 2869, 2876–2878 (2010). 
17 See Arbaugh, 536 U.S. at 511-512, discussing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 
486 U.S. 107 (1988). 
18 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2877-2878 (2010). 
19 Arbaugh, Morrison, Id. 
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to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) 
with foreign nations” unless its additional conditions are met.20  That is to say, in the 
FTAIA Congress expressly stated that the Sherman Act does reach “import” trade or 
commerce.21 
The principle favoring nonjurisdictional interpretation is also an issue of law.  
Nevertheless, it places greater control with the fact finder to the extent that issues of 
extraterritorial reach and domestic impact are addressed under ordinary pleading or 
summary judgment standards in which facts are ordinarily construed against the 
movant.  That is, in a jurisdictional motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), facts pertaining to the statutory requirements of extraterritorial 
reach are decided by the judge.  By contrast, if issues concerning extraterritorial reach 
are subject to a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss they are facts subject to the ordinary 
pleading and summary judgment rules that construe facts against the movant, and may 
later make them subject to jury trial. 
It is perhaps likely, although not inevitable, that the Supreme Court will conclude that 
the FTAIA is not a jurisdictional provision at all.   The purpose of the Supreme Court’s 
Arbaugh holding was to require a clear statement, and the “shall not apply” language of 
the FTAIA provision quoted above certainly creates some ambiguity.  The rule that the 
Supreme Court stated in Arbaugh, however, was that the “legislature” must clearly state 
its intention to make the statute jurisdictional.22  Although the explicit language of the 
FTAIA – “shall not apply” --  might be regarded as ambiguous, the Conference Report 
and other legislative history of the FTAIA are not.  The Conference Report noted that 
the statute was designed to eliminate uncertainty that American companies faced when 
engaged in international trade by establishing a clear “jurisdictional threshold” for 
                                            
2015 U.S.C. §6a (emphasis added). 
21 See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (“[I]t is well 
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce 
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”) 
22Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–16 (2006): 
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count 
as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to 
wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on 
coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
character. 
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application of the antitrust laws.23  The House Committee concluded that the domestic 
effect standard articulated in the provision should serve as a requirement “for antitrust 
jurisdiction,” with a “court” deciding in the first instance if those “requirements for subject 
matter jurisdiction are met.”   Further, the Committee Report stated that the FTAIA “only 
establishes the standards necessary for assertion of United States antitrust jurisdiction. 
The substantive issues on the merits of plaintiffs' claim would remain unchanged.”24  
The most reasonable interpretation of these statements is that Congress clearly 
intended for the FTAIA to limit subject matter jurisdiction, but that it was less clear when 
it actually drafted the FTAIA, whose “shall not apply” language can be interpreted either 
way.  Of course, at the time Congress drafted the FTAIA it did not yet have the benefit 
of the Arbraugh holding to the effect that a statute’s “jurisdictional” conduct must be 
unambiguous. Congress at the time was far less careful about how it drafted 
jurisdictional language. 
The FTAIA and the Foreign Commerce Clause 
 Whether or not the FTAIA is jurisdictional as a statute, the Constitutional 
authority of Congress to enact antitrust laws emanates from the Commerce Clause, 
which gives Congress the authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."25  The difference between “with” 
and “among” remains important, even after judicial expansion that permitted broader 
“affecting commerce” holdings in the 1940s.26  Trade between Ohio and Illinois is 
commerce “among” the states, but trade between Australia and Indonesia is not United 
States commerce “with” foreign nations.  Rather, it is “among” (actually, between) 
foreign nations.  Such trade is presumably outside of United States’ jurisdictional reach 
unless some other factual element sufficient to be construed as commerce “with” foreign 
nations or perhaps some other jurisdiction creating effect is shown.  This is so quite 
apart from the FTAIA.  The Sherman Act’s own language tracks the language of the 
Commerce Clause, reaching restraints “of trade or commerce among the several 
                                            
23S. Conf. Rep. 97-644, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982).  See also H.R. Conf. Rep., 97-924, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (The new title incorporates two sections from H.R. 5235 which “modify 
the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to require a ‘direct, 
substantial, and reasonable foreseeable” effect on Commerce in the United States, or on the 
export commerce of a U.S. resident, as a jurisdictional threshold for enforcement actions….’” 
24H.R. Rep. 97-686, at 2-3, 5-6, 9, 11, 13. 
25 UNITED STATES CONST., Art. 1, §8 cl. 3. 
26 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-125 (1942). 
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States, or with foreign nations” in §1; and every person who monopolizes “any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations” in §2.  Even 
under expansive “affecting commerce” interpretations, courts periodically dismiss 
antitrust complaints involving purely local conduct on interstate jurisdictional grounds.27 
 Some things do constitute commerce “with” foreign nations but would be 
excluded under the FTAIA.  For example, a cartel in the United States that exported all 
of its output and had no harmful effects within the United States might injure a foreign 
purchaser in Europe.  Such a restraint would constitute commerce “with” foreign 
nations, which appears to embrace products that move in both directions, but the FTAIA  
would not embrace an injury that accrued only to the foreign purchaser. 
The statute provides that: 
Sections 1 to 7 of the Title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce 
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless— 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign 
nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a 
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; 
and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of 
sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section. 
 
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the 
operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply 
to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.28 
 
Some antitrust actions brought by foreign plaintiffs for injuries felt in foreign 
countries could not be reached under the Sherman Act even if the FTAIA did not exist.  
This would be true of transactions that occurred purely among two foreign nations, with 
no domestic effects whatsoever.  Other transactions have only the most tenuous effect 
                                            
27 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, note __ at ¶266. 
28 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (Oct. 8, 1982). The Act is codified at various sections of 12, 
15, and 30 U.S.C.  The quoted provision appears in 15 U.S.C. §6a. 
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on United States commerce.  For example, in Empagran the plaintiffs were foreign 
farmers from the Ukraine, Australia and elsewhere who purchased vitamins from foreign 
sellers.  Apparently none of the challenged transactions involved either a United States 
buyer, a United States seller, or other intermediary.29  However, the foreign sellers were 
participants in a global price-fixing conspiracy that did involve United States firms and 
presumably United States buyers.  As a result one could say that the cartel “as a whole” 
was within the jurisdiction of the United States as involving commerce with foreign 
nations.  However, the effects that caused injury to the United States purchasers were 
not the ones that “give[] rise to a claim,” within the FTAIA’s requirement.30 
 
In domestic cases the Supreme Court has generally applied an analysis that 
looks to the general effects of the restraint in order to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction, and then permits the plaintiff’s cause of action even if the injuries suffered 
by the individual plaintiff seem quite local.31  That is to say, under this interpretation the 
general restraint must meet the commerce requirement, but the particular injury that the 
plaintiff suffered does not necessarily need to meet it.  This issue provoked a 5-4 split in 
the Supreme Court’s Pinhas decision, where the majority held that an alleged boycott 
excluding the plaintiff fell within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act even though the 
particular restraint imposed on the plaintiff involved only a single physician’s staff 
privileges at a single hospital.  Justice Scalia and three other dissenters insisted that 
while Congress has the power to reach all restraints affecting interstate commerce, it 
did not do so in §1 of the Sherman Act: 
 
That enactment does not prohibit all conspiracies using instrumentalities of 
commerce that Congress could regulate. Nor does it prohibit all conspiracies that 
have sufficient constitutional “nexus” to interstate commerce to be regulated. It 
prohibits only those conspiracies that are “in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States.”  This language commands a judicial inquiry into the 
nature and potential effect of each particular restraint.32 
 
                                            
29 See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003) vacated 
sub nom. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 175 (2004). 
30 See the quoted language in text at note __, supra. 
31 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991); see ¶266g. 
32 Id., 500 U.S. at 334. 
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The interpretation of Justice Scalia’s Pinhas dissent parallels the “gives rise to a 
claim” language in the FTAIA,33 which requires a showing not only of the relevant 
jurisdictional effects, but adds the requirement that these affects, already within foreign 
commerce subject matter jurisdiction, are the ones that give rise to the plaintiff’s claim.  
Perhaps noteworthy is that Justice Scalia interpreted this narrowing constraint on the 
Sherman Act’s coverage as “jurisdictional.”34 
 
Pleading Requirements and Looking Beyond the Pleadings 
 
 The biggest practical difference between motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) and motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under FRCP 12(b)(1) is that in the 12(b)(6) motion the judge is obliged to restrict the 
universe of relevant facts to those stated in the complaint plus others of which the court 
may take judicial notice.  By contrast, in a 12(b)(1) situation the judge may call for 
discovery on the jurisdictional issue and, upon obtaining it, may decide the relevant 
jurisdictional facts without a jury and without any requirement that all alleged facts must 
be accepted as alleged or that all reasonable inferences must be construed in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  As the Third Circuit articulated the differences in Animal Science, in a 
12(b)(1) case the burden rests with the plaintiff, “who must establish that there is subject 
matter jurisdiction; by contrast, the defendant carries the burden in a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.”35 
 While the theoretical differences between these two procedures are significant, 
the practical one may not be in the great majority of situations.  Even under 12(b)(6) 
pleading standards the plaintiff must plead its case with sufficient particularity to survive 
dismissal.36  For example, at the least a plaintiff purchaser must identify the parties from 
                                            
33 15 U.S.C. §6a. 
34 Pinhas, 500 U.S. at 333, 336: 
To determine Sherman Act jurisdiction it looks neither to the effect on commerce of the 
restraint, nor to the effect on commerce of the defendants' infected activity, but rather, it 
seems, to the effect on commerce of the activity from which the plaintiff has been 
excluded. As I understand the Court's opinion, the test of Sherman Act jurisdiction is 
whether the entire line of commerce from which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded affects 
interstate commerce. 
35 Animal Science Prods., Inc. v China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2011). 
36 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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whom he purchased.  If they are alleged to be involved in a cartel the plaintiff would 
have to identify as best as possible the participants in the cartel and make allegations 
concerning its general effect on domestic or foreign commerce as defined by the 
Constitution.  The plaintiff would also have to allege with some particularity how it was 
injured and, under the FTAIA, offer fact specific allegations to the effect that the effect 
on reachable commerce is what “gives rise to a claim.” 
 For example, the district court in Animal Science found that the relevant 
pleadings were “not cognizable even for the purposes of facial review, as defined in 
Twombly and Iqbal.”37  The plaintiff had made very general allegations of a conspiracy 
among unspecified co-conspirators and also made a general allegation that the 
conspiracy had the “purpose and effect of fixing prices of magnesite and magnesite 
products exported to and purchased in the United States.”38  That is to say, if the district 
court was correct the case was properly dismissed under either a 12(b)(6) merits 
standard or a 12(b)(1) jurisdictional standard.  Significantly, however, the issue was 
raised sua sponte by the court “in light of the jurisdictional uncertainties presented by 
the case at bar.”39  In sum, the court considered the issue at all only because it had the 
power to do so, given that the reach of the FTAIA was deemed to be jurisdictional, but 
then it decided the question exclusively by reference to the pleadings.  In reversing, the 
Third Circuit held that the issue of FTAIA reach pertained to subject matter rather than 
jurisdiction, and thus required that the analysis be limited to the four corners of the 
complaint.  It did not decide that the complaint stated a claim for Rule 12(b)(6) 
purposes, but rather remanded to the district court for that determination.40 
 Even if the FTAIA is not jurisdictional, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to 
“state a claim” under the FTAIA, which entails pleading of a “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” that “gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman Act.  
Indeed, the district court’s “jurisdictional” analysis of the FTAIA in the Animal Science 
case was based on allegations in the complaint itself which the court found lacking in 
                                            
37 Animal Science, 702 F.Supp.2d 320, 341 (D.N.J. 2010). 
38 Id. at 339-340. 
39 Id. at 330, and citing a district court’s “continuing obligation to sua sponte raise the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction” on the court’s “own motion.” 
40 Animal Science, 654 F.3d at 469-470. 
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factual specificity.41  However, the court also buttressed these conclusions with 
evidence taken from exhibits provided by experts for both sides.42   
 The Minn-Chem decision in the Seventh Circuit did not dispute that the FTAIA’s 
limitations were jurisdictional, following its own previous decisions on that issue.43  
Nevertheless, the court analyzed the claims solely by looking at the face of the plaintiff’s 
complaint, which was by United States potash buyers against Canadian, Belarusian and 
Russian potash producers for allegedly forming a cartel and price fixing in other foreign 
markets, which was alleged to cause substantial price increases in the United States as 
well.  The defendants moved to dismiss under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) in the alternative, 
and the district court considered the motion under (12)(b)(6) standards, looking 
exclusively at the face of the complaint.44  However, as the Seventh Circuit concluded, 
the district court erred in essentially merging the import commerce exception with the 
direct effects exception.  The defendant’s conduct fell outside of the FTAIA’s reach 
because the conduct itself was not alleged to target the United States.  As a result, the 
complaint did not state a sufficient link between the foreign conduct and the United 
States: 
 If foreign anticompetitive conduct can “involve” U.S. import commerce even if it 
is directed entirely at markets overseas, then the “direct effects” exception is 
effectively rendered meaningless. Under the district court's reading of the statute, 
                                            
41 As the district court noted, 
The bulk of Plaintiffs' pleadings related to the FTAIA exception fail to assert any facts 
(offering, instead, a kaleidoscope of self-serving conclusions and/or recitals of legal 
elements) and the remainder of Plaintiffs' statements assert facts that either negate 
Plaintiffs' claims or are self-contradicting, or inapposite to Plaintiffs' position, or 
unwarranted in light of Plaintiffs' own evidence, or based on deficient assumptions and 
inexplicable conclusions.  
702 F.Supp.2d at 362.  See also id. at 363-364, analyzing ambiguities in the plaintiffs’ complaint. 
42 See id. at 375. 
43 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 657 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2011) (to the extent it is relevant, the 
author was consulted by a defendant).  See also United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical 
Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2003) (en banc) (concluding that FTAIA is jurisdictional) (to the 
extent it is relevant, the author was consulted by a defendant). 
44 Potash Antitrust Litig., 667 F.Supp.2d 907, 941-942 (N.D.Ill. 2009). 
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a foreign company that does any import business in the United States would 
violate the Sherman Act whenever it entered into a joint-selling arrangement 
overseas regardless of its impact on the American market. This would produce 
the very interference with foreign economic activity that the FTAIA seeks to 
prevent.45 
The Seventh Circuit also took the approach of looking at the complaint alone 
under (12(b)(6), relying on the pleading standards articulated in Twombly and Iqbal. 46 
The court noted the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions suggesting that the FTAIA 
would now be determined not to be jurisdictional,47 and suggested that the 
“jurisdictional” holding of its previous United Phosphorous case48 might be “ripe for 
reconsideration.”49  However, because the defendants were entitled to dismissal under 
either 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) it did not need to confront the issue. 
 By contrast, in its earlier United Phosphorous decision the district court had 
made factual findings pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction attendant on a 12(b)(1) 
dismissal motion, and the Seventh Circuit concluded that these factual findings were not 
clearly erroneous.  The plaintiffs were Indian firms who alleged that they were hoping to 
enter the market for Nitroparaffins and their derivatives but were restrained from doing 
so by the exclusionary practices of American firms.50  In dismissing the complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(1) the district court relied on additional evidence beyond the complaint that 
indicated that the plaintiffs in fact had no real ability to sell these products in the United 
States.51 
 Other appellate and district court decisions prior to Animal Science offer similar 
mixtures of analysis.  Nearly all of them were decided consistent with the assumption 
                                            
45 657 F.3d at 660-661, citing Empagran, 542 U.S. at 161. 
46 657 F.3d at 653, citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
47 See Id. at 653, citing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2876–77 
(2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). 
48 United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2003) (en banc). 
49 Minn-Chem, 657 F.3d at 653. 
50 See United Phosphorus, Ltd v. Angus Chem Co., 131 F.Supp.2d 1004 (N.D.Ill. 2006). 
51 Id. at 1010-1015. 
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(never rigorously disputed) in the Supreme Court’s Empagran decision that the question 
of FTAIA reach is “jurisdictional.”  Of course, Twombly and Iqbal cut across all cases.  
That is, first the allegations stated in the complaint itself must suffice to state a claim.  
Then an only then does a court go beyond the complaint to ascertain relevant 
jurisdictional facts. 
 Some court have purported to decide the jurisdictional issue but in fact have 
looked only at the language of the complaint, principally because the defendant’s attack 
was purely “facial.”52  In the protracted Carpet Group litigation the plaintiffs offered a 
great deal of collateral documentary evidence in support of jurisdiction.  The district 
court appeared to have dismissed the complaint by examining the pleadings and not 
considering the collateral evidence.53  In reversing, the Third Circuit panel concluded 
that both the district judge and the magistrate who had initially examined the case 
“ignored significant additional evidence offered by the plaintiffs to back up their other 
allegations.”54 
 It is probably worth noting that most of the “collateral” evidence that the plaintiff’s 
put forward in Carpet Group would probably end up being described in the complaint 
                                            
52 E.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2002) (purely facial 
challenge addressed under 12(b)(1) but apparently looking only at the face of the complaint).  On 
the “jurisdictional” issue the Animal Science decision expressly overruled Turicentro.  See 
Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 467-468 (3d Cir. 2011).  
See also Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424-425 (5th Cir. 
2001) (observing that on a 12(b)(1) motion the court may consider supplemental evidence but 
apparently looking only at the complaint; also observing that the defendant had filed motions to 
dismiss under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), but that district court had ruled only on the former).  In 
Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the 
court found jurisdiction under the FTAIA in the face of motions to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, but it appeared to have looked only at the complaint, holding that the district 
court had erroneously found that the complaint failed to allege jurisdiction.  See id. at 1083. 
53See Carpet Group, Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n., Inc., 227 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2000).  
54 Id. at 70.  Much of the balance of the panel’s opinion was then taken up with the question of 
the district judge’s obligation to sift through the collateral evidence.  Id. at 70 – 73.  A later 
decision on the merits denied a motion for summary judgment on some, but not all, of the 
plaintiff’s claims with little discussion of the FTAIA.  256 F.Supp.2d 249 (D.N.J. 2003); yet 
later, the Third Circuit affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict for the defendants, again with little 
discussion of the FTAIA.  Carpet Group Intern. V. Oriental Rug Importes Ass’n., Inc., 173 
F3d.App. 178 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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under Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards.  The judge would have to consider it anyway, 
although under 12(b)(6) standards requiring the court to accept the allegations as true.55 
Conclusion 
 In its Arbaugh decision the Supreme Court insisted that a federal statute’s 
limitation on reach be regarded as “jurisdictional” only if the legislature was clear that 
this is what it had in mind.  The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) 
presents a puzzle in this regard, because Congress seems to have been quite clear 
about what it had in mind; it simply failed to use the correct set of buzzwords in the 
statute itself, and well before Arbaugh assessed this requirement.  Even if the FTAIA is 
to be regarded as non-jurisdictional, the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act is 
hardly unlimited.  It reaches only to restraints affecting commerce “with” foreign nations 
rather than those affecting commerce “among” the several states.  At the same time, 
however, the canon of construction against extraterritorial application should not apply 
to the Sherman Act.  First, the statutory language condemning restraints of trade or 
monopolization of commerce “among the several States, or with foreign nations” is not 
boilerplate and clearly extends to foreign commerce.  Second, the FTAIA itself 
expressly recognizes or grants the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach to “import trade 
or import commerce.” 
The implications for interpreting the FTAIA as limiting the antitrust law’s subject 
coverage rather than the court’s jurisdiction are mainly that, even if the language of the 
complaint states a claim, the district court will be able to conduct its own jurisdictional 
fact findings.  Further, this inquiry may occur at any time during the proceeding, may 
occur on the court’s own motion, and cannot be waived.  A nonjurisdictional 
interpretation of the FTAIA will thus make it more difficult for defendants to obtain 
dismissals at an earlier stage.  Even here, however, the Supreme Court Twombly and 
Iqbal decisions require greater specificity in pleading, and will thus serve to diminish the 
difference between the standards for a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
                                            
55 See In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 558 (D. Del. 2006): 
 
 In reviewing a factual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is 
not confined to the allegations of the complaint, and the presumption of truthfulness does 
not attach to the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint…. Instead, the Court may 
consider evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits, depositions and testimony, 
to resolve any factual issues bearing on jurisdiction (internal citations omitted). 
 
